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 THE RISE IN ELDER BANKRUPTCY 
FILINGS AND THE FAILURE OF U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
John A. E. Pottow 
Recent empirical legal scholarship on the consumer bankruptcy system has uncovered 
a marked rise in the proportion of elder Americans filing for relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  But these studies have not probed the reasons behind that rise, an 
omission this Article seeks to address.  Professor John Pottow and colleagues recently 
assembled the new dataset of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), the largest 
national sample of consumer debtors in this country, which he uses to explore the 
sources of elder bankruptcy.  The findings are both striking and ominous.  While 
multiple factors, such as health problems and medical debts, contribute to elders’ 
financial distress, the dominant force appears to be overwhelming burdens related to 
credit cards.  Elder debtors carry fifty percent more credit card debt than younger 
debtors, and they cite credit card interest and fees as a reason for their bankruptcy 
filings fifty percent more frequently, results that are highly statistically significant. 
Professor Pottow uses further survey and court record data from the CBP to explore 
why elders rely upon credit cards more than their younger counterparts.  Finally, 
Professor Pottow addresses the current Bankruptcy Code, noting that it is both a 
theoretical and doctrinal mismatch for elder debtors, and proposes possible reforms. 
 
John A. E. Pottow is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Pro-
fessor Pottow received his A.B. in psychology, summa cum laude, from Harvard Col-
lege and his J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School.   
Professor Pottow acknowledges his generous colleagues from the Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project who assisted in the completion of this manuscript in varying degrees, 
ranging from help in designing the initial database to reviewing and commenting 
on written drafts of the Article.  He would also like to thank Maximilian Bulinski, Sara 
Greene, and Reshma Jagsi, who helped with research, data analysis, and editing. 
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Recent empirical scholarship on the consumer 
bankruptcy system has documented a marked rise in the proportion 
of elder Americans filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code.1  
Although somewhat modest in absolute percentages (7.0%)2 and still 
beneath their proportionate level of the general population (12.4%),3 
the rate of increase of this demographic within the ranks of the 
bankrupt has been striking.  This Article uses the dataset of the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), assembled in 2007, to explore 
the conditions of these elder filers.4  Although teasing causation out of 
cross-sectional data is a perilous task,5
                                                                                                                             
 
 1. See, e.g., Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The In-
creasing Vulnerability of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87 (2009). 
 the hope is that analysis of 
some of the unique characteristics of these elder debtors will shed 
light on the underlying puzzle: why are elder Americans filing for 
bankruptcy at such an alarmingly increasing rate?  The data suggest a 
phenomenon driven largely, although not exclusively, by credit cards.  
For example, credit card interest and fees are the most cited reason for 
filing bankruptcy by elders, with two-thirds of elder debtors 
specifically invoking this reason, substantially more than the half of 
younger debtors who do so.  Findings also reveal that the median 
elder debtor in bankruptcy carries fifty percent more credit card debt 
than the median younger filer.  After presenting these data, this 
 2. See id. at 97. 
 3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION BY 
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 
2006 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST 
2006-sa.html. 
 4. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP) is a multi-institutional consor-
tium of which I am a co-principal investigator.  Funding for the CBP was provided 
in part by grants from the American Association of Retired Persons, the Harvard 
Law School, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the University of Michigan 
Office of Vice President for Research, and the University of Michigan Law School. 
 The co-principle investigators of the CBP are: David U. Himmelstein, Professor of 
Public Health, City University of New York; Melissa B. Jacoby, George R. Ward 
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Robert M. Lawless, 
Professor of Law and Galowich-Huizenga Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois 
College of Law; Angela K. Littwin, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas 
School of Law; Katherine M. Porter, Professor of Law, University of Iowa College 
of Law; Teresa A. Sullivan, President, University of Virginia; Deborah K. Thorne, 
Associate Professor, Ohio University; Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School; and Steffie Woolhandler, Professor of Public Health, 
City University of New York.   
 5. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & 
Steffie Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a Na-
tional Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 745 (2009).  
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Article briefly considers current bankruptcy law and policy, noting 
how poorly suited the Bankruptcy Code is to assist those elder 
Americans whose financial distress has brought them to seek relief in 
the courts. 
I. The Swelling Ranks of Elder Bankruptcy Filers 
Bankruptcy filers are getting older.  The median age of a filer 
was 36.5 in 1991, which increased to 40.6 in 2001, and increased again 
to 43.0 by 2007.6  Moreover, the number of elder filers has risen quick-
ly.  As first reported in our findings published in 2008, CBP data show 
the number of bankruptcy filers age sixty-five and over doubled from 
2.1% in 1991 to 4.5% in 2001.7
  
  This trend persisted in 2007 as the pro-
portion of filers in this age group rose further to 7.0%. (See Table 1.)  
Indeed, the age sixty-five-and-over cohort is the fastest growing age 
demographic within the CBP sample. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 6. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 93 fig.1.  The median age of the general 
population was 36.1 for 2007, an imperfectly comparable number given that child-
ren traditionally do not file bankruptcy but are included in the general population 
count. Id. 
 7. “Filers” comprise the co-petitioning spouse in a joint petitioner bankrupt-
cy.  (Married couples may, but need not, file joint petitions.)  Thus, in reporting 
our age findings, we count a bankruptcy filing as “elder” if either the primary or 
co-petitioning debtor is age sixty-five or over in the case of joint petitions.  (We ob-
viously also count all single petitions where the petitioner is age sixty-five or over.)  
Note that this will actually undercount the number of elder Americans affected by 
bankruptcy filings, because we miss the cases in our count where there is a mar-
ried petitioner under age sixty-five who files a single petition but is married to a 
spouse who is age sixty-five or over. 
3
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TABLE 1 
 
Source: Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vul-
nerability of Older Americans: Evidence From the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
87, 93, tbl 1 (2009) (reporting CBP data).   
These findings on the greying of the bankruptcy population are con-
sistent with other studies.  For example, in a study of 24,038 applicants 
for credit counseling (a necessary prerequisite to filing bankruptcy), 
the Institute for Financial Literacy reported that 7.8% of applicants 
were age sixty-five or over.8  Similarly, an Administrative Office of the 
United States Court (AO) statistician and analyst reported that the 
median age of a bankruptcy filer had risen from 37.7 in 1994 to 41.4 by 
2002.9
                                                                                                                             
 
 8. LESLIE E. LINFIELD, INST. FOR FIN. LITERACY, AGING AND BANKRUPTCY: 
ARE OLDER AMERICANS TRULY AFFORDED AN ECONOMIC FRESH START? 7–8 (2007); 
accord Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Filers Most Likely in 
25–44 Age Range, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002, at 28, 29 (finding that of 
1931 no-asset Chapter 7 cases that were closed in 2000, 6.5% of the debtors were 
age sixty and over).   
  Another recently released AO paper found the number of peti-
 9. John Golmant & Tom Ulrich, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Aging and Bank-
ruptcy—The Baby Boomers Meet Up at the Bankruptcy Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 
2007, at 26, 27.  The authors report their age cut-off at fifty-five, and so while one 
cannot compare CBP data directly, they do seem consistent. Id. 
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tioners age sixty-five and over to be 7.4%.10  Smaller scale bankruptcy 
studies have reached similar results.11  According to general popula-
tion research, the growing elder financial distress does not seem con-
fined to bankruptcy.12  Indeed, this greying phenomenon also seems 
to have hit other countries.13
II. Scrutinizing Elder Debtors: The Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project 
  The run-up in elder bankruptcy filings, 
thus, may well be part of a broader social trend.  All that is known for 
certain at this point is that the trend of rising elder bankruptcies is 
pronounced and persistent.  The challenge for scholars is to try to un-
derstand why it is so. 
The initial data in the previous section reporting the age of bank-
ruptcy filers were gathered from the CBP, a multi-institutional consor-
tium of scholars from various disciplines, including law, medicine, 
and sociology.14  Methodological summaries of the CBP’s research 
protocols have been published in varying degrees of detail elsewhere, 
so only the briefest of summaries follows.15
                                                                                                                             
 
 10. See John Golmant & James A. Woods, Aging and Bankruptcy Revisited, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 34, 74.  
  The CBP is the first na-
tional sampling of consumer bankruptcy filers after the Bankruptcy 
 11. See, e.g., Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: A Closer 
Look at Elderly Chapter 7 Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 22, 22 (estimat-
ing 4.4% of no–asset, non-business Chapter 7 cases closed from 1998–2000 were 
filed by petitioners age seventy or older). 
 12. HANA HOLLEY, RETIREMENT PLANNING SURVEY AMONG U.S. ADULTS AGE 
40 AND OLDER 20–21 (2006), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/ 
ret_planning.pdf (reporting thirty percent of surveyed retirees viewed their debt 
levels as a “problem”). 
 13. See Janis Sarra, Growing Old Gracefully, An Empirical Investigation into Elder-
ly Bankrupt Canadians, in ANN. REV. OF INSOLVENCY LAW 2006, at 783, 784 (Janis 
Sarra ed., 2007) (reporting more than a doubling of Canadians over age fifty-five 
filing for bankruptcy within a decade). 
 14. I am one of the ten current co-principal investigators of the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project.  For helpful links on CBP research, visit Harvard’s cognate 
Bankruptcy Data Project at http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/fellows.cfm. (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2011). 
 15. See Robert Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Fail?, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 
387–98 (2008) (offering comprehensive methodological summary).  An analysis of 
methodological issues specific to analyzing data from the elder subpopulation is 
available in Deborah Thorne, The (Interconnected) Reasons that Elder Americans File 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 22 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 188, 190 (2010).  
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).16  
Our core dataset constitutes approximately 2500 questionnaires re-
turned from filers in all U.S. judicial districts from a period in early 
2007.  Extensive coding of the bankruptcy court filings of question-
naire respondents was also added to this dataset.  Finally, a subset of 
1000 of the respondents completed in-depth telephone interviews 
with trained researchers.  Thousands of pieces of data were collected 
on over a thousand bankruptcy filers, including through telephone 
interviews.  By examining these court records and surveys, the CBP 
dataset allows rich insights into the many Americans facing financial 
distress who find need to seek relief in the bankruptcy courts.17
Because our previous research already indicated a notable rise in 
elder Americans filing for relief, we augmented our CBP core sam-
pling of randomly selected debtors with a deliberate oversample of 
debtors age sixty-five and older.  Again, detailed elaboration of the 
process we used to find the ages of these filers is available else-
where.
 
18  To summarize, through a process of age estimation (age is 
not listed on the court records), the CBP was able to target an addi-
tional 192 bankruptcy filers throughout the surveyed districts where 
the primary or secondary petitioner was age sixty-five or over.  Com-
bined with the core sample, this yielded a dataset of hundreds of elder 
bankruptcy filers (one of the largest such sets to date).19
The richness of the CBP dataset allows us to study with greater 
nuance why elder Americans might be filing for bankruptcy at such 
an increasing rate.  Most previous studies rely upon the court records 
alone, which allows only limited insight beyond the identity of credi-
tors and amount owed.
 
20
                                                                                                                             
 
 16. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); see also Lawless et al., supra note 
  For example, one such earlier study sug-
15, at 354 (dis-
cussing CBP). 
 17. As discussed in a previous publication of some of these data, we have no 
intrinsic reason to believe BAPCPA had any age-specific effects; as such, we would 
not predict the rise in elder filers to be a consequence of anything in the 2005 
amendments. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 91.  
 18. See Thorne, supra note 15, at 204 n.3. 
 19. Compare, for example, Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11, at 22, who ex-
amined only thirty-nine elder debtors.  
 20. For example, the Golmant and Ulrich study, Golmant & Ulrich, supra 
note 9, while methodologically rigorous, relies upon court record data alone.  Such 
studies are important but contribute to our understanding of the circumstances of 
elder bankruptcy filers differently.  The same limitation applies to the Flynn and 
Bermant studies.  Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11; 
Flynn & Bermant, infra note 21. 
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gests credit card debt plays a large role in elder filings but is left to 
concede with frustration, “Unfortunately, the bankruptcy petitions 
[on their own] do not reveal much about how this debt was incurred.  
We have no information regarding how the credit cards were used—
e.g., for medical debt, living expenses, luxury items, gambling, etc.”21
III. Credit Cards Causing Elder Filings 
  
The CBP’s dataset builds upon these prior court record efforts by sup-
plementing publicly available data with rich details from self-
reporting.  This allows examination of these issues in greater depth, 
the results of which are reported in this Article.  
A. Self-Report Metric from Questionnaire 
The simplest way to discover why people file for bankruptcy is 
to ask them.22  The CBP questionnaire has just such a question, pro-
viding a non-exclusive choice of answers from which respondents can 
pick.23  The non-exclusive choice format means debtors can pick more 
than one reason.  In reporting the data below, I include any respon-
dent who cites the “credit card” reason, whether it was the exclusive 
explanation for the filing or whether it was one of several others, such 
as a medical reason.24
                                                                                                                             
 
 21. Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Credit Card Debt 
in Chapter 7 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 20, 20. 
  Here is where one finds the first and most im-
portant datapoint: the elder filers most frequently selected credit 
cards—more specifically, the fees and interest rates on their credit 
cards—in explaining why they went bankrupt.  Of the elder debtors, 
 22. It is also a highly reliable way.  See generally David U. Himmelstein, Eliza-
beth Warren, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, MarketWatch: Illness and In-
jury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/02/02/hlthaff.w5.63.full.pdf+html. 
 23. One choice from the menu of non-exclusive reasons was “Interest and fees 
on credit cards were overwhelming.” 
 24. This methodological decision reflects a preference at the margin for clarity 
over nuance.  For example, as a more nuanced test, I could have cross-referenced 
the open-ended narrative question that respondents were invited to complete to 
expand on their bankruptcy filing experience to assess whether, for example, cre-
dit cards were the “driving purpose” of the filing, but I preferred the bright-line 
clarity of the cruder approach.  I also considered including only respondents who 
cited credit card reasons alone when responding to the reason-for-filing question; I 
rejected that approach based on the considerable number of respondents who 
cited more than one reason from this non-exclusive list.  Ultimately, I am interest-
ed in how many people feel credit cards played at least “a part”—indeed, a part 
significant enough for them to self-report in reflecting on causal forces—in their 
collapse into bankruptcy.  
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66.6% reported credit cards as a reason for filing.  Not only was this 
the most frequently cited reason (followed by “medical reasons”), but 
elder debtors chose “credit cards” as an explanatory reason more fre-
quently than younger debtors to a statistically significant degree.  
(Only 53.3% of younger debtors cited credit card reasons, p < 0.01.)  
(See Figure 1.)  Thus, two-thirds of elder Americans who filed for 
bankruptcy ascribed credit cards as a reason for their downfall.25  This 
finding accords with the implication of earlier U.S. studies26 and stu-
dies from other countries.27
  
  (“Implication” is used because most of 
these studies were unable to report the debtors’ self-ascribed reasons 
for filing.) 
                                                                                                                             
 
 25. Although not similarly worded, and although drawn from a different 
population (credit counseling applicants), the data from the Institute for Financial 
Literacy are somewhat similar.  “Overextended on credit” was cited by 62.8% of 
applicants (more than any other reason given) as a cause of financial distress.  
LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 13.  Similarly, a study of Canadian debtors over age fifty-
five found “overextension of credit” as the most frequently listed primary cause of 
bankruptcy and that that reason increases in likelihood as a function of the deb-
tor’s age.  See Sarra, supra note 13, at 801–02. 
 26. These numbers continue the rising trend of elder credit card debt.  For ex-
ample, in the 2002 Flynn and Bermant study (based on no-asset, non-business 
Chapter 7 filings from 1998–2000), the authors estimate $24,360 in median bank 
credit card debt for age-reporting filers age seventy or over (vs. $10,587 median 
credit card debt for younger filers) plus an additional $2233 in median store credit 
card debt (vs. $1035 median store credit card debt for younger filers). See Flynn & 
Bermant, supra note 11, at 22, 49 tbl.2.  Similarly, a related study published in 2004 
(based on data from no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 2000 to 2002) 
estimates that “average” credit card debt for age-reporting filers age sixty-five or 
over was $27,787—the highest of any other age demographic—although the mea-
surements used are not directly comparable. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 
74 tbl.4.  A third study from 2003 (based on no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 fil-
ings from 2000) estimates $35,917 in mean credit card debt for age-reporting filers 
age sixty or more. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at 4. 
 27. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 798–99 (finding that while overall debt decreas-
es as a function of age of Canadian debtors over age fifty-five, credit card debt by 
contrast increases). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
B. Credit Card Trends from Court Records 
In addition to measuring the effect of credit card debt through 
self-ascription as reported above, the CBP also coded court records for 
incidence of credit card debt, in part to share methodology with prior 
studies.  Even though it was used as a method in prior studies, coding 
court records proved difficult given the ambiguities in creditor identi-
fication.  Recognizing these ambiguities, the CBP employed two con-
centric definitions of credit card debt, loosely corresponding to “defi-
nitely” credit card debt and “probably” credit card debt, based on the 
identity of the scheduled creditor.28
                                                                                                                             
 
 28. A debt was considered “definitely” credit card debt if the listing on Sche-
dule F of the bankruptcy petition contained the words “credit card,” “card,” “re-
volving credit,” “charge account,” or closely similar terms.  Also, any listing that 
contained brand name words for a credit card such as “Visa,” “Mastercard,” or 
“Discover” was counted as definitely credit card debt.  Debts were considered 
“probably” credit card debt if the listing on Schedule F contained the name of one 
of the top ten credit card issuers at the end of 2006 (Bank of America, JP Morgan 
Chase, Citigroup, American Express, Capital One, Morgan Stanley (Discover), 
HSBC Holdings, Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp), even if the list-
ing did not contain words like “credit card” or a brand name like “Visa.”  Debts 
were also considered probably credit card debt if they used the terms “line of cre-
dit,” “revolving loan,” or “personal loan” in the Schedule F description. 
  Both definitions showed stark 
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differences by age.  For debtors who held at least some credit card 
debt, younger filers had a median of $13,615 in definite credit card 
debt and $15,499 in combined definite and probable credit card debt, 
contrasted with elder debtors, who had a median of $22,562 in definite 
and $27,213 in combined definite and probable credit card debt, high-
ly significant differences under either metric (p < 0.001 for each).29 
(See Figure 2.)  The court record data are thus consistent with the 
questionnaire results showing credit cards as the engine for elder fil-
ings.30  Indeed, not only do elder bankruptcy filers have more credit 
card debt than younger filers, they carry substantially higher balances 
than their non-bankrupt age group cohorts in the general popula-
tion.31
  
  In sum, elder debtors are not just growing in number, but they 
seem to have more credit card debts and cite credit card problems as 
their reason for filing bankruptcy more frequently than any other age 
group. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 29. For elder debtors, the means were $33,995 for definite and $37,076 for 
combined definite and probable, and for younger debtors, the means were $22,775 
for definite and $25,267 for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each).  
Considering only the subset of debtor who answered that they filed bankruptcy 
due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards, the differences show the 
same pattern: elder debtors had a median of $28,075 (mean $29,239) for definite 
and $31,622 (mean $43,201) for combined definite and probable credit card debt, 
and younger debtors had median of $19,034 (mean $27,885) for definite and 
$22,024 (mean $31,112) combined definite and probable credit card debt.  These 
median differences also were highly significant: p < 0.001 for definite and p < 0.001 
for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each mean). 
 30. The Flynn and Bermant series of studies all show this disproportionate 
trend, with credit card debt rising as a function of age. See Flynn & Bermant, supra 
note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21.  The 2002 
paper shows the over-age-sixty cohort as holding five times as much credit card 
debt as filers under age twenty-five and that the credit card debt constituted over 
seventy-five percent of general unsecured debt. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at 
28–29.  The 2004 paper estimates it at four times as much (using age sixty-five as a 
cutoff). Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74.  
 31. According to the Survey of Consumer Finance 2007 Chartbook, the me-
dian credit card balance (for cardholding households) whose head of household 
was between age sixty-five and seventy-four was $3000.  SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCE, 2007 SCF CHARTBOOK 1160 (2007), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/Pubs/OSS/oss2/2007/2007%20SCF%20Chartbook.pdf. 
10
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FIGURE 2 
 
IV. Why Credit Cards for Elder Debtors? 
Finding that elder filers are disproportionately citing over-
whelming interest and fees on credit cards as reasons for filing bank-
ruptcy and carrying such high credit card balances invites speculation 
over why this is so.  That is, if we assume credit cards are not mar-
keted disproportionately to people age sixty-five and over, then it 
must be something about the debtors themselves that makes them rely 
inordinately upon credit cards, and to their own peril.  As one prior 
study laments in discussing another’s finding that credit card debt 
amongst elder debtors who file Chapter 7 bankruptcy seems to be 
growing the fastest, “No explanation is given as to why the older deb-
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tors incurred the most credit card debt . . . .”32  Researchers, however, 
are now starting to try.  For example, a project conducted by the Na-
tional Consumer Law Center has gathered some qualitative data on 
the rise in elder credit card debt generally.33
There are several possible reasons why we might expect to see 
elder borrowers particularly drawn to credit cards.  First, credit card 
reliance could stem from incompetence or lack of sophistication.  
Cognitive and other frailties might lead elder borrowers to fall victim 
to what some have called the “tricks and traps” model of consumer 
credit card lending, becoming lost in the dizzying barrage of small 
print contractual provisions that others may be able to parse with 
greater sophistication.
  Consequently, the time is 
ripe to use survey data on bankruptcy filers to enhance our under-
standing of this unsettling trend. 
34
                                                                                                                             
 
 32. Golmant & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 53–54. 
  Alternatively, the difference could stem from 
strategy or profligacy.  It could be that elder debtors are more cunning 
than their younger peers, knowing that they can load up profligate 
expenses on credit cards and then discharge these unsecured debts in 
a bankruptcy filing.  A third possible reason could be anonymity or 
covering.  It could be that elder borrowers are drawn to the quasi-
secrecy that credit card borrowing accords: debtors with a revolving 
credit balance are able to borrow (albeit it at a comparatively expen-
sive rate) by running a balance without telling their families or 
friends.  Still another possibility is social or financial isolation.  Per-
haps bankrupt elders are relying on credit cards more than others 
 33. DEANNE LOONIN, JULIA DEVANTHERY & STEVE TRIPOLI, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., THE LIFE AND DEBT CYCLE: PART ONE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF RISING 
CREDIT CARD DEBT AMONG OLDER CONSUMERS (2006) [hereinafter NCLC PART 
ONE]; DEANNE LOONIN & JULIA DEVANTHERY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE 
LIFE AND DEBT CYCLE: PART TWO: FINDING HELP FOR OLDER CONSUMERS WITH 
CREDIT CARD DEBT (2006) [hereinafter NCLC PART TWO].  The studies analyze 
elder legal services users and find a variety of sociological forces at work in elder 
financial distress, including lack of financial sophistication, a strong repayment 
ethic, and aggressive creditor conduct. 
 34. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: 
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Elizabeth 
Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel) (explaining that “giant lenders ‘compete’ 
for business by talking about nominal interest rates, free gifts, and warm feelings, 
but the fine print hides the things that really rake in the cash.  Today’s business 
model is about making money through tricks and traps.”); see also NCLC PART 
ONE, supra note 33, at 6 (reporting legal services director in West Virginia describ-
ing the “very low” level of financial sophistication of clients, especially elderly 
women: “some of them still think there are debtors’ prisons”).   
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simply because they do not have access to alternative forms of credit 
and are using cards as funds of last resort.  This list of four possible 
reasons—incompetence/unsophistication, strategy/profligacy, ano-
nymity/covering, or social/financial isolation—does not purport to be 
comprehensive, and surely some reasons are capable of overlapping 
with others.  Fortunately, the survey instruments of the CBP allow us 
to report further findings that engage some of these conjectures.  They 
are now reported, as categorized by these possible explanatory hypo-
theses. 
A. Incompetence/Unsophistication 
Self-report instruments present challenges in assessing mental 
competence.  The question, “Are you too incompetent to handle your 
own credit cards?” is unlikely to generate reliable data (although, to 
be sure, the respondents of our surveys cover a range of highly per-
sonal subject matter with what is believed to be a strong level of can-
dor).35  Direct data of age effects on financial competence are thus dif-
ficult to gather, at least through self-report methodologies like 
surveys.  That said, some creative researchers have made strides using 
alternative designs.  One recent study, for example, analyzes credit 
reports and credit card usage patterns to conclude that financial acuity 
peaks in middle age and then declines in the senior years,36 and 
another uses a financial literacy test module for the University of 
Michigan’s 2008 Health and Retirement Study to find diminishing li-
teracy by age (on a dismal baseline).37
As an example of an indirect measure of financial competence, 
one question on the CBP questionnaire asked debtors whether being 
  But direct self-report data re-
main a tall order.  The CBP’s methodology, however, does allow us to 
glean insight from indirect measures of financial competence. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 35. See, e.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 22.  
 36. See SUMIT AGARWAL ET AL., THE AGE OF REASON: FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
OVER THE LIFE CYCLE WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION 51(2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790 (finding elder—and 
younger—credit card users made more “mistakes,” such as paying higher credit 
card fees and interest rates than they were otherwise required under the circums-
tance, than middle-aged users). 
 37. Half of respondents cannot correctly answer two simple questions on in-
flation and interest rates. See Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy and Finan-
cial Sophistication Among Older Americans 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 15469, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15469. 
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“tricked by creditors” was a reason for filing bankruptcy.  The data do 
not reveal an age effect: 15.0% of younger filers indicated they filed 
because they felt they had been tricked by creditors, which was in fact 
slightly more (but not significantly so statistically) than the 11.3% of 
elder filers who so answered. 
Perhaps a better approach than measuring “competence” might 
be to gauge what could be called debtor financial “sophistication.”  
On the CBP questionnaire, debtors were asked whether before bank-
ruptcy they requested creditors to work with them on their payments, 
which is a plausible proxy for financial sophistication (or at least forti-
tude).  Here, we do see elder respondents diverge from their younger 
counterparts.  For elders, only 37.8% replied yes, they had asked their 
creditors to work with them, which was statistically significantly low-
er than the 60.0% of younger filers who did so (p < 0.01). 38
  
 (See Figure 
3.) 
                                                                                                                             
 
 38. We also asked debtors if they had attempted to consolidate their debt.  Of 
filers who had at least one credit card, 36.3% of younger filers replied that they 
did, compared with 30.7% of elder filers, a difference that was statistically signifi-
cant (p < 0.026).  For all debtors, 34.4% of young filers and 30.0% of elder filers at-
tempted to consolidate their debt, a difference that was not statistically significant.  
Interestingly, while more than half of the elder debtors reported being contacted 
by debt collectors (58.0%), that number was significantly lower than the younger 
debtors who had been so contacted (84.5%) (p < 0.001).  Perhaps it is the need to 
respond to the hectoring of debt collectors that prompts younger debtors to initiate 
negotiation discussions.  This interpretation might paint debt collectors as serving 
a salutary function of prompting discussion.  On the other hand, by several me-
trics, the elder respondents were less likely than their younger counterparts to cite 
pressure from debt collectors as a reason for filing.  For example, only 34.9% of 
elder written questionnaire respondents cited pressure from debt collectors as a 
reason for filing, compared with 47.6% of their younger counterparts, a difference 
that is highly significant (p < 0.001).  Additionally, 55.8% of elder phone survey 
respondents reported that pressure from debt collectors was either very much or 
somewhat a reason for filing, compared with 79.6% of younger filers (p < 0.001).  
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FIGURE 3 
 
Thus, one sees some data, albeit indirect, suggesting elder deb-
tors who end up in bankruptcy are just not as sophisticated financially 
as their younger peers in terms of negotiating with creditors.  But the 
most striking difference along age lines in this area is the number of 
credit cards bankrupt elders held.  In the two years before filing for 
bankruptcy, 18.2% of younger debtors held no credit cards, while only 
10.3% of elder debtors had none.  Even more strikingly, 32.4% of 
younger debtors held five or more credit cards, while 44.8% of elder 
debtors held that many.39
  
 (See Figure 4.) 
                                                                                                                             
 
 39. Significance: p < 0.01 for no credit cards; p < 0.001 for five or more cards, 
on proportion distribution (prtest).  
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FIGURE 4 
 
Again, one must be cautious in interpreting these data.  If 
drowning in an excessive number of credit cards reveals a lack of fi-
nancial sophistication, then these data contribute another indicator 
suggesting bankrupt elders may be less sophisticated financially.  On 
the other hand, an opposite narrative is plausible: that the large num-
ber of credit cards held by elder debtors reveals their adroit ability to 
juggle numerous cards, transferring balances from one to the other 
with high sophistication.  The proper inference cannot be conclusively 
determined, which is why triangulation with other data is necessary.  
Given that in the self-report questionnaire, more bankrupt elders 
blame credit card interest and fees as the source of their demise than 
any other reason, it is likely the multiplicity of cards shows less, not 
more, financial sophistication. 
B. Strategy/Profligacy 
Many have opined that credit cards accord special opportunity 
for abuse by allowing consumers the chance to run up large bal-
ances—constrained only by minimum monthly payments and account 
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limits—with unsecured loans that are generally capable of complete 
discharge in bankruptcy.40  Could it be that the elder group’s dispro-
portionate self-report of credit card bankruptcies reveals a generation-
al difference in profligate spending?  At the outset, the irony of this 
possibility should be noted, as some previous studies addressing 
bankruptcy stigma rely upon age as a proxy for positive moral charac-
ter.41
The debate on the role of stigma in bankruptcy is as well re-
hearsed and as lengthy as the discussion of its methodological chal-
lenges.
  Could elders have less shame and hence be more willing to ex-
ploit credit cards? 
42  The CBP nevertheless attempted some direct measure of 
bankruptcy stigma by asking respondents the degree of embarrass-
ment they had associated with their filings.  Those results show not 
only a robust continued role of bankruptcy’s stigma, but no apprecia-
ble age difference.  Filers of all ages reported being mortified at hav-
ing had to file: 50.9% of elder filers and 52.1% of younger filers re-
ported being “very much” embarrassed to file, and an additional 
29.5% of elder filers and 30.5% of younger filers reported being 
“somewhat” embarrassed to file.  Thus, the elders were equally em-
barrassed, just as they reported being equally “scared” at having to 
file: 53.5% of elder filers and 56.1% of younger filers reported being 
“very much” scared to file, and 28.7% of elder filers and 29.7% of 
younger filers reported being “somewhat scared” to file.43
                                                                                                                             
 
 40. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 
BYU L. REV. 177, 206; Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1534 (2005). 
 (See Figure 
5.)  Even trying to proxy for other signs of profligacy, one is still una-
 41. E.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 187, 200–05 (1998).  How empirically supported this assumption is remains 
questionable.  Indeed, one recent survey found that seventy-three percent of res-
pondents age sixty-five or over characterized a television as a “necessity” com-
pared with fifty-three percent of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine.  See 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., LUXURY OR NECESSITY? THINGS WE CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT: 
THE LIST HAS GROWN IN THE PAST DECADE 11 (2007). 
 42. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary In-
crease in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006).  
 43. Similarly, 88.9% of young respondents and 87.3% of elder respondents 
reported being “relieved” at filing.  Interestingly, the relief seemed to provide big-
ger respite for the elder debtors: while “only” 62.3% of elder respondents reported 
being currently stressed about their finances (at the time of their telephone inter-
views, i.e., well after they filed for bankruptcy relief), 72.1% of the younger filers 
were already stressed again. 
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ble to support an inference that elder debtors are more morally lax 
than others.  They seem to purchase lottery tickets and frequent casi-
nos at the same rate as their younger cohorts in bankruptcy.44  Indeed, 
the debtors sampled in the CBP as a whole do not seem to indulge in 
these free-spending pastimes any more often than their non-bankrupt 
peers.45  One might be inclined to conclude that such data would help 
retire the “loose morals” myth regarding the typical bankruptcy deb-
tor, but such myth is likely to prove long-lived.46
  
  Consequently, the 
increased credit card usage of elder debtors does not seem part of a 
grand scheme of age-dependent fraud. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 44. The elder response rates to these questions mirror the CBP population 
responses as a whole.  See infra note 45. 
 45. About half visited casinos in the past year, the same as in the Detroit Area 
Household Financial Services Study (a study of moderate- and low-income general 
households in the Detroit area), although this comparison should perhaps be qual-
ified by Detroit’s geographic proximity to numerous casinos.  For an overview of 
this study, see Michael Barr, Detroit Area Study on Financial Services (Overview), 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~msbarr/detroit_area_study.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2011).  Additionally, 56.5% did not buy lottery tickets in the year before 
their bankruptcy, 24.2% did so a few times per year, 7.7% did so about once a 
month, 9.0% did so about once a week, and only 2.7% did so almost daily. 
 46. The Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five found ninety-
eight percent reported that it was difficult to tell family and friends about their fil-
ing, some discussing at length their feelings of shame, fear and humiliation. See 
Sarra, supra note 13, at 810. 
18
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 17 [2010]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art17
   237 
FIGURE 5 
 
Note the deliberate conflation of two related but analytically dis-
tinct grounds for reliance on credit cards in this discussion of strategy 
and profligacy.  The first is invidious conduct: strategic behavior and 
the concomitant immunity from shame revealed by use of credit cards 
with no intention to repay.  Here we see no age differences in the re-
ported instrument measures trying to proxy for shamelessness.  The 
second ground is what might be better considered “morally lazy” 
conduct: profligate use of credit cards, not because of premeditated 
financial fraud, but because of impulse control shortcomings.  Assum-
ing, only arguendo, that credit card balances serve as a proxy for prof-
ligate spending, then perhaps elder people have more difficulty con-
trolling their spending urges than younger debtors.   
Without getting sidetracked on whether such a trait is more 
properly classified as a value-neutral “competence” problem (and 
hence belongs in the previous section’s discussion on sophistication) 
or as a value-laden “personal failing” (and hence properly belongs in 
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this discussion of strategic and profligate conduct),47 I simply present 
the apposite data from the CBP.  One of the self-reported reasons for 
filing bankruptcy that respondents could specifically choose was 
“problems controlling spending.”  Over a quarter of the debtors sam-
pled by the CBP admitted that this was at least one of their problems 
leading to the need to file bankruptcy.  This was not the most fre-
quently selected reason, or even one of the top five reasons, but the 
considerable number of people admitting that self-control issues 
caused financial failure ought to dampen fears of a self-serving bias 
amongst respondents.48
  
  This question, ironically, is one area where 
the elder respondents diverged from their younger colleagues: whe-
reas almost a third of younger respondents (28.6%) cited spending 
control problems as a reason for filing bankruptcy, less than a quarter 
(22.6%) of the elder respondents did so (p < 0.02). (See Figure 6.)  Ac-
cordingly, reliance on credit cards seems less linked to spendthrift 
conduct with elder debtors, suggesting other causal factors must be at 
work in explaining the elder credit card phenomenon. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 47. Far from suggesting personal weakness or laziness, the overwhelming 
majority of respondents felt filing bankruptcy was “the responsible thing to do.”  
In fact, elder respondents reported “struggling” with their debts before filing 
bankruptcy for a shorter period of time than younger debtors (30.0% vs. 40.0% (p < 
0.01)), which, coupled with the high rate of elder debtors who believed filing was 
the responsible decision, could lead to the conclusion that the elder debtors were 
quicker to own up to failure and take what was perceived as the responsible path. 
 48. See Thorne, supra note 15, at 194–200. 
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FIGURE 6 
 
C. Anonymity/Covering 
Another possibility for increased reliance on credit cards by 
elder debtors is the inherent anonymity of the credit product.  Unlike 
a traditional bank loan that requires sitting down with a banker, or a 
lifeline from a family member that requires an awkward conversation, 
revolving credit card balances are effectively at the election of the bor-
rower.  Up to the credit limit, the debtor can charge daily consump-
tion items in times of cash flow shortfall without turning to external 
sources for help.  Why might this be of relevance to elder borrowers?  
Sociologists have for some time noted that elder persons are especially 
disinclined to seek help for a complex variety of reasons.  For exam-
ple, Elizabeth Moen describes the “non-acceptor syndrome,” and 
finds that “the elderly are quite reluctant to seek or accept help.”49
                                                                                                                             
 
 49. Elizabeth Moen, The Reluctance of the Elderly to Accept Help, 25 SOC. PROBS. 
293, 295–96, 302 (1978). 
  
She further finds that this disinclination to seek assistance varies as a 
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function of the degree it requires the person to make an acknowled-
gement of failure, such that “assistance or services perceived as 
earned or available to all elderly are the most acceptable, while those 
that require a public declaration of poverty are the least acceptable.”50  
A leading sociology authority similarly concludes: “Because of per-
sonal pride and a desire to remain independent, many elderly people 
hide financial problems, even from their own families.”51  Qualitative 
data confirm these assessments,52
In response to the question of how comfortable they would be 
borrowing money from family and friends, fewer than a quarter of the 
elder CBP respondents answered that they would be somewhat or 
very comfortable (23.1%), whereas more than a third of younger res-
pondents (36.1%) would be somewhat or very comfortable (p < 0.001).  
This in turn may explain why when asked how they coped with their 
financial distress before filing for bankruptcy, the elders again “un-
derperformed” their younger debtor colleagues in asking friends and 
family for assistance, by 35.2% to 68.7%—less than half as likely to do 
so (p < 0.001).  Similarly, only 2.9% of elder debtors tried to cope by 
asking for help from charities or churches, compared with 10.8% of 
younger debtors (p < 0.001). (See Figure 7.) 
 and many of the elder debtors arti-
culated this sentiment in the phone interviews.  As one elder debtor 
captured it, “I didn’t want people to know we filed bankruptcy, be-
cause they would look at me a different way.  To this day, nobody 
knows.  I thought it was a loser that had to do that.”  These sociologi-
cal observations suggest that the attraction of credit cards may indeed 
be heightened for elder consumers in financial distress, and the data 
from the CBP lend some support. 
Finally, and perversely, not only do the elder debtors appear 
disproportionately loath to ask for assistance from others—perhaps 
preferring the secrecy of the credit card—they also disproportionately 
try to help other family members facing their own financial problems.  
One of the reasons for filing bankruptcy respondents could choose on 
the CBP questionnaire was “tried to help family/friends.”  Elder deb-
tors listed this as a cause in 22.3% of cases; younger filers only did so 
                                                                                                                             
 
 50. Id. at 302. 
 51. JOHN J. MACIONIS, SOCIOLOGY 405 (11th ed. 2007). 
 52. See generally NCLC PART TWO, supra note 33, passim (reporting on, inter 
alia, field interviews with elder assistance programs and clients). 
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for 15.9% (p < 0.002).53  In fact, in the interview portion of the phone 
survey, several elder debtors expressed frustration at their decisions 
to help family.  One debtor said she was angry “that our kids could 
make us get into that situation,”54 and another said he was angry be-
cause “I felt very betrayed by my sons.”55
FIGURE 7 
   
 
D. Social/Financial Isolation 
The data in the previous section suggest that bankrupt elders 
might be drawn to credit cards in order to avoid asking people for 
help as a way of coping with financial distress.  This in turn raises 
another question: is the disinclination to ask for help animated by 
psychosocial preference, or is it compelled by lack of access to a sup-
                                                                                                                             
 
 53. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_451D (date of interview on file in 
project archive).  
 54. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_195R (date of interview on file in 
project archive). 
 55. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_072O (date of interview on file in 
project archive). 
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port network?  In other words, it could be that elder debtors would be 
delighted to ask for help, but they simply have fewer supporters to 
seek out (or, more precisely, fewer financially relevant supporters to 
seek out).56  Again, the CBP findings shed light.  Apart from the ques-
tion of how comfortable debtors would be asking for financial help 
from family or friends, a separate question asked, “Could you borrow 
from family and friends if needed?”  While two-thirds of younger 
debtors responded that they could (66.3%), substantially fewer elders 
(57.7%) said they could, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 
0.01).57 (See Figure 8.)  Perhaps relatedly, the demographic informa-
tion on the CBP bankrupt population shows them as less likely to be 
married and more likely to be divorced than the general population.58
  
  
                                                                                                                             
 
 56. This qualification is added because these findings cannot distinguish be-
tween elders who lack support networks altogether (have no friends/family) and 
elders who have emotional support networks but lack financial support networks 
(have family/friends, but who are themselves all tapped out financially).  
 57. In the Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five, seventy-
four percent said it would have been helpful if they could have talked to someone 
about their financial problems prior to filing bankruptcy. See Sarra, supra note 13, 
at 811. 
 58. The general population data show approximately fifty-four percent of 
people are married (compared with forty-four percent of CBP debtors) and ap-
proximately nine percent are divorced (compared with twenty-five percent of CBP 
debtors).  Interestingly, about three in ten individuals age sixty-five and older in 
both the general population and the CBP pool were widowed.  See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006 tbl.A1 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps 
2006.html. 
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FIGURE 8 
 
When asked questions specifically designed to uncover whether 
they were using credit cards to hide debts from otherwise available-
to-help families and friends, however, the respondents’ age did not 
reveal meaningful differences.59  For example, when asked whether 
they were worried they would be a burden on family or friends if they 
discussed their financial problems, both elder and younger debtors 
were equally split regarding their concern.60  Similarly, when asked 
whether they thought revealing financial distress would make family 
members doubt the debtors’ financial abilities, respondents showed 
no discernible differences based on age (with about half worrying 
about this).61
                                                                                                                             
 
 59. It is of course impossible to exclude denial as an explanation for the elder 
response rates. 
  Thus, it is not clear whether the reliance on credit cards 
 60. Fifty-four percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agree-
ment, compared with sixty-two percent of younger debtors (ns). 
 61. Fifty-five percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agree-
ment, compared with fifty-four percent of younger debtors (ns).  This was appar-
ently a false worry on behalf of the respondents: elder debtors reported less harm 
to family relationships as a result of filing than younger debtors.  In response to a 
question whether family relationships were damaged by the bankruptcy filing, 
12.0% of elder debtors reported damage while 20.7% of younger debtors reported 
damage, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.03). 
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is animated by secrecy or simply because credit cards are the easiest 
form of accessible credit.   
One is, therefore, hesitant to overstate the findings of social iso-
lation.  Yes, it does seem that the elder bankruptcy debtors have fewer 
resources, but that could simply be compounding a pre-existing prob-
lem of secrecy—or pride—alluded to in the previous section.  It is one 
thing to find that elder debtors are no more worried than younger 
debtors regarding assessments of their competence in revealing their 
financial distress to others.  That does not suggest heightened reliance 
on credit cards to hide debts from family.  But it is quite another to 
find that the elder debtors are less likely than younger ones to turn to 
charities and churches, which surely do not discriminate based on 
age.  That reluctance does suggest an attitudinal mechanism at 
work—possibly resulting from stubbornness, pride, denial, or a dif-
ferent repayment ethic.  The data thus reveal the complexity of the is-
sue; certainly more than one force is at work.62
V. Elder Financial Collapse: Funding a Structural 
Deficit? 
 
The descriptive financial data of the elder debtors suggest that 
they are poorer than other bankruptcy filers.  Although bankruptcy 
filers on the whole are poorer than the general population (having 
lower incomes, higher debt loads, etc.),63 the elder filers are dispropor-
tionately poorer than the younger filers—the poorest of the poor.64
                                                                                                                             
 
 62. One interesting finding from the Canadian study was that some elder fil-
ers reported “loneliness” as a reason for taking up economically destructive activi-
ties (e.g., gambling), which forty percent attributed as playing a causal role in their 
bankruptcies. See Sarra, supra note 
  
The monthly income of the elder debtors is lower than that of the 
younger ones, taking into account all sources of income, with a differ-
ence that is statistically significant (highly so): $2304 for the younger 
13, at 810. 
 63. Sullivan et al., supra note 42, at 222. 
 64. Life-cycle consumption enthusiasts will be quick to point out that elders 
“should” be poorer (more precisely, that their comparative impecunity is not 
troubling), because they have fewer consumption needs.  That is, of course, true to 
a point but does not help answer the question why the elder bankruptcy ranks are 
swelling.  It could be that the elder debtors, while having fewer consumption 
needs, are falling below an income floor required to meet even those lower needs 
and hence are turning to credit cards maladaptively for income supplementation. 
26
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 17 [2010]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art17
   245 
debtors compared with $1940 for the elder debtors (p < 0.001).65  
While elder debtors have lower monthly incomes than younger deb-
tors, their total unsecured debt is about the same.  The median unse-
cured debt owed by elder debtors is $33,270, while the median owed 
by younger debtors is $32,723, underscoring the important role that 
credit card debt must be playing in elders’ unsecured debt loads.66  
Finally, as a distress ratio, the median elder unsecured debt-to-income 
ratio is 1.5 (mean 2.2), while the median younger debt-to-income ratio 
is 1.2 (mean 2.0), a difference that was highly statistically significant.67
This finding of comparative poorness raises the issue of co-
variance: the fact that we see elder debtors carrying more credit card 
debt and blaming credit cards for filing bankruptcy more than their 
younger cohorts could be a function of their comparatively poorer po-
sition.  Thus, age could be a co-variate of “poor” such that either fac-
tor predicts credit-card-based reasons for filing bankruptcy.  A logit 
regression, however, shows that the probability of filing bankruptcy 
due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards increases if one 
is elderly, even when controlling for income.
   
68
Background data on employment motivations augment the view 
that these elder debtors in bankruptcy are in tough economic straits.
  This suggests that 
there is something about age qua age, not just age as a proxy for poor-
ness, at work. 
69  
A little more than one-third of elder CBP filers reported that they had 
retired but then returned to the workforce.70
                                                                                                                             
 
 65. Means: elder = $2248; younger = $2640, p < 0.001.  The median total assets 
for younger filers was $50,885, compared with $43,511 for the elders—lower, but 
not statistically significant in light of the wide dispersion of asset levels.  Means: 
elder = $89,265; younger = $102,369, ns. 
  When asked why they 
were working or seeking employment, only 35.9% reported it was for 
 66. Means: elder = $50,773; younger = $48,519, ns. 
 67. Note that one study actually finds credit card debt increases with income. 
See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 20 (finding a discontinuous “jump” at zero 
income to higher levels of credit card debt). 
 68. Controlling for assets did not change the logit findings, an unsurprising 
result given that assets were insignificantly correlated with age.  See supra note 65. 
 69. See Clare Ansberry, Elderly Emerge as a New Class of Workers—and the Job-
less, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting rising trend of elders needing to 
return to or remain in the workforce to make ends meet). 
 70. Although one might expect many elders to be retired, twenty-three per-
cent responded that they coped with their financial problems before bankruptcy 
by looking for more work.  In addition, almost fifty percent of elders selected “loss 
of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy (although this was fewer than the 
younger debtors who did so). 
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love of work; 74.4% candidly admitted it was because they needed 
money to cover everyday expenses; and 18.0% explicitly said it was to 
earn money to pay for health care and medical expenses, with 15.4% 
also saying it was to get health insurance benefits.71  Going back to 
work seems a necessity for many of these elder debtors, and the qua-
litative interview data reflect that it is not easy.  As one debtor la-
mented, “It’s hard out here at seventy-one trying to make a living.  
Hope you don’t have to file bankruptcy at seventy-one and still try to 
work.”72
These findings further support the concern that the swelling 
ranks of elder Americans filing bankruptcy are running out of money, 
and the picture is not pretty for those that do.  For example, 9.7% re-
port having gone without food while struggling before bankruptcy, 
31.2% report being late on rent or mortgage, 31.2% report going with-
out required medication (47.1% for the subset who filed bankruptcy 
for medical reasons), and 21.2% report skipping doctors’ appoint-
ments (30.6% for the subset who filed for medical reasons).
 
73  Thus, 
one of the most sobering findings of the CBP data may be this stark 
fact: although all bankrupt debtors are in tough financial straits, the 
elder filers are in incredibly tough straits—an ominous portent of 
what may await the baby boomers.74  Whether this relates to the esca-
lating costs of health care is certainly a possibility,75 as is the prospect 
that the abolition of the defined-benefit pension plan plays a role.76
                                                                                                                             
 
 71. Interestingly, of the elder respondents, 64.4% reported having a “Medi-
gap” health insurance policy to cover at least some medical expenses unpaid by 
Medicare. 
 
 72. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_2308 (date of interview on file in 
project archive). 
 73. Although elder debtors answered these questions affirmatively at general-
ly lower rates than younger filers, the absolute number of elder debtors experienc-
ing financial privations was striking. 
 74. For a study of low- and moderate-income consumers’ increasing reliance 
on credit cards to fund living necessities, see TAMARA DRAUT ET AL., DEMOS & 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND 
DEBT IN AMERICA—FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OF CREDIT 
CARD DEBT AMONG LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2005), available at 
http://ww.demos.org/pubs/PSN_low.pdf.  
 75. See Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans?: Hearing 
Before the  Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 56 (2009) (statement of John A. E. Pottow, Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of Michigan). 
 76. Employer-sponsored “Medigap” insurance policies as a retirement benefit 
fell from sixty-six percent of employers in 1988 to thirty-eight percent in 2003. 
HEATHER C. MCGHEE & TAMARA DRAUT, RETIRING IN THE RED, THE GROWTH OF 
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It may also simply be the financial shock of retirement itself that 
elder Americans are ill-suited to face.77  Recent data show credit coun-
seling applicants citing “retirement” as a cause of financial distress 
among 5.4% of respondents.78  Given only 9.4% of respondents cate-
gorized themselves as retired, this suggests that retirement has re-
quired pre-bankruptcy credit counseling for more than half of reti-
rees.79  Further exploration of these conjectures must await future 
study.  The relevant observation for now is that credit cards may be a 
short-term (and ultimately unsuccessful) financing solution for the 
elder debtors to a structural financial deficit.80  If Americans cannot 
live out their senior years, even with Medicare, on their current in-
comes without relying on credit cards and then going bankrupt, the 
findings of this study may provide early evidence of a deep societal 
problem of overindebtedness.81
                                                                                                                             
DEBT AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 56 (2004), available at http://archive.demos.org/ 
pubs/retiring_2ed.pdf.  Ominously, one recent study shows that the poverty rate 
is six times higher in elder households that do not have pension income. FRANK 
PORELL & BETH ALMEIDA, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., THE PENSION FACTOR: 
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS IN REDUCING ELDER HARDSHIPS 17 
(2009), available at http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/pension_ 
factor_web.pdf. 
 
 77. The National Consumer Law Center styles retirement as a “trigger” or 
“shock” that can push elder consumers barely managing their credit card mini-
mum payments “over the edge.”  NCLC PART ONE, supra note 33, at 8. 
 78. LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 14. 
 79. Id. at 10–11. 
 80. One encouraging finding is that elder respondents reported better results 
on whether bankruptcy helped them.  For example, “only” 33.1% of elder filers 
said they were currently (i.e., at the time of their phone interviews, well after they 
filed bankruptcy) still struggling with bills, as opposed to an astonishing 54.2% of 
younger filers.  Still, “only” is in quotation marks, because it is equally sobering 
that one-third of “fresh start” elders with a bankruptcy discharge are still strug-
gling with bills.  As for medical bills, 40.7% responded they were still having 
trouble with medical bills after bankruptcy, which was actually better than the 
59.6% of younger respondents (but still higher than the general level of those 
struggling for their age group). 
 81. Much research has emerged on the deteriorating financial circumstances 
of American seniors.  For example, logistic regressions on the 2000 Health and Re-
tirement Study find age 65–74 as a predictive variable of both consumer and mort-
gage debt. Yoon G. Lee, Jean M. Lown & Deanna L. Sharpe, Predictors of Holding 
Consumer and Mortgage Debt Among Older Americans, 28 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 305, 
317 (2007).  Other researchers have even designed a “National Retirement Risk In-
dex.” See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson, Barbara A. Butrica & Corina Mommaerts, Work 
and Retirement Patterns for the G.I. Generation, Silent Generation, and Early Boomers: 
Thirty Years of Change (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2010–8, 2010), 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2010-8.pdf.  
One strand of this elder financial distress research supports the idea of reliance on 
housing debt in particular as a hole-plugging strategy. See, e.g., George S. Masnick, 
Zhu Xiao Di & Eric S. Belsky, Emerging Cohort Trends in Housing Debt and Home Eq-
uity (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. 05-1, 2005), 
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VI. Beyond Credit Cards: Medical Bankruptcy and Elder 
Americans 
The CBP data on elder debtors suggest a strong and increasing 
role of credit cards in bankruptcy filings, which may reveal a number 
of influences at work.  The large role of credit cards, however, should 
not eclipse other reasons for the run-up in elder bankruptcies, such as 
medical causes.  The subject of medical bankruptcies has been ad-
dressed elsewhere, including in earlier reports of the CBP data,82 and 
Congress has already held hearings on the matter.83  A brief detour 
into this domain seems appropriate, however, because the senior 
population may be taking a disproportionate hit from medical bank-
ruptcies.  For example, 59.1% of elder respondents to the CBP survey 
said that they changed their lifestyles before bankruptcy to help afford 
medical bills (significantly more than the 47.9% of younger filers).84
Defining “medical bankruptcy” is an issue that has prompted 
both scholarly and political debate that is unnecessary to revisit 
here.
 
85
                                                                                                                             
available at 
  Briefly stated, prior studies using the CBP data employ an ag-
gregate approach to defining medical bankruptcy.  For example, the 
clearest instance of a medical bankruptcy would be if someone se-
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w05-1.pdf (gen-
eral analysis of rising housing debt of elder Americans); William C. Apgar & Zhu 
Xiao Di, Housing Wealth and Retirement Savings: Enhancing Financial Security for Old-
er Americans 5 (Harv. Univ. Joint Ctr. For Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. 05-8, 
2005), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w05-8.pdf 
(finding mortgage debt had risen from twenty percent of elder consumer debt in 
1989 to seventy percent in 2001); id. at 5 tbl.2 (finding elder homeowners still with 
a mortgage rose from twenty percent in 1989 to twenty-six percent in 2001); id. at 5 
tbl.2 (median mortgage debt tripled for this age demographic to $44,000); see also 
MCGHEE & DRAUT, supra note 76, at 1 (finding one-fifth of elder households with 
incomes below $50,000 (i.e., seventy percent of them) are in “debt hardship,” 
meaning more than forty percent of their income is devoted to debt service). 
 82. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 5, at 741.  An excellent analysis, using 
data from an earlier round of the CBP, can be found in Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. 
Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evi-
dence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001). 
 83. E.g., Medical Debt: Can Bankruptcy Reform Facilitate a Fresh Start?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. (2010),  available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get 
doc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:56473.pdf. 
 84. Even though the number of elders was significantly lower than the num-
ber of younger debtors answering affirmatively (p < 0.01), almost fifty percent se-
lected “loss of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy. 
 85. Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans?: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 50–60 (2010) (Statement of John A. E. Pottow, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Michigan), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers 
/111th/111-56_51346.pdf. 
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lected “health reasons” as one of the choices on the self-report ques-
tionnaire as a reason for filing.  But one might additionally define a 
medical bankruptcy as one where a debtor had more than a threshold 
amount of debt in medical bills (e.g., $5000), or had more than a cer-
tain percentage of his or her income in medical debt (e.g., over ten 
percent).  Another question in the CBP instrument asks homeowners 
whether they had to mortgage their houses to cover medical bills.  Re-
searchers might also code affirmative responses to this question as a 
“medical bankruptcy,” even if, in the debtor’s mind, he or she went 
bankrupt because of mortgage foreclosure.  Accordingly, it is possible 
to think of “narrower” and “broader” definitions of a medical bank-
ruptcy: there is no intrinsically correct one. 
Taking a narrow approach—debtors who specifically responded 
that a medical reason for them or their spouse led to bankruptcy—
elder filers answered affirmatively in 39.1% of cases (significantly 
more than the 31.2% of younger debtors (p < 0.002)).86  Similarly, 
32.6% of elder filers specifically cited medical bills as a cause for filing 
(compared with 28.9% for younger debtors).87  (These numbers are not 
cumulative, so someone could answer “yes” to both questions.)  On 
another measure, 30.2% of elder filers spent more than $5000, or ten 
percent of their annual household income, on out-of-pocket medical 
bills.  These numbers employing a narrower metric suggest that medi-
cal bankruptcies are an important reason for elders’ filings, but not as 
significant as credit cards.  On the other hand, taking a broader defini-
tion (matching prior scholarly studies),88
The point of reporting these data of medical bankruptcies is not 
to weigh in on the debate whether a narrower measure (say, the 39% 
 where a debtor selecting any 
one of these alternative metrics of medical bankruptcy qualifies, the 
data show 67.3% of elder filers could be linked to a medical bankrupt-
cy—a number almost exactly the same as the amount who cite credit 
cards. 
                                                                                                                             
 
 86. Jacoby et al., supra note 82, at 397–98 (finding similar response rates from 
1999: 46.7% of elder debtors and between 20 to 35% of younger debtors (depend-
ing on the age group)).  Caution should be used in directly comparing these fig-
ures due to methodological differences, though the numbers do seem close enough 
to offer at least rough confirmation. 
 87. This comparison was not statistically significant, perhaps suggesting the 
medical problems translate more into lost work or more indirect problems rather 
than straight unpaid medical bills for elders. 
 88. E.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 5, at 743.  
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who simply self-report a reason for filing as “medical”) or a broader 
measure (say, the 67% who meet any definition) is more appropriate.  
Rather, it is to underscore that medical bankruptcies are highly preva-
lent in the rapidly growing ranks of elder filers.  This stark reality 
holds true for a demographic cohort that is supposed to have near-
universal health insurance coverage through the Medicare program 
(and is consistent with surveys conducted outside the bankruptcy 
realm).89
More important for this Article’s focus on credit cards is the fact 
that we have no perfect way of disaggregating a medical “versus” a 
credit card bankruptcy, as conceded by authors of earlier studies.
  Indeed, 40% of the elder filers in the CBP reported that it 
was “very much” or “somewhat” difficult to pay their Medicare pre-
miums and copays. 
90  
Indeed, as the previously reported data on credit cards reveal, one 
reason elder debtors may be relying on credit cards is because they 
need financing to cover everyday consumption expenses.  Thus, there 
is no absolute way of knowing whether a credit card bankruptcy is or 
is not also a medical bankruptcy.91  Although some initial research is 
unfolding,92 much more needs to be done.  All our data indicate for 
sure is that both credit cards and medical issues are important—the 
most important—determinants of elder bankruptcy filings.93
                                                                                                                             
 
 89. See DRAUT ET AL., supra note 74, at 10 tbl.2 (reporting that twenty-nine 
percent of low- and middle-income households surveyed cited illness or necessary 
medical expenses as contributing to their current credit card balance). 
 
 90. See, e.g., Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74 n.4 (qualifying rudimentary 
estimation of medical debt). 
 91. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink 
of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 242–43 (2010) (explaining 
problems in counting medical bankruptcies and the role credit cards play). 
 92. See id. at 268–71 (analyzing medical bankruptcy data meticulously and 
reconciling lower reported Schedule F medical expenses with significantly higher 
spending on medical bills); see also CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, BORROWING 
TO STAY HEALTHY: HOW CREDIT CARD DEBT IS RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 4 
(2007) (estimating $6800 in medical expenses for credit card borrowers over age 
sixty-five). 
 93. We also unearthed a pernicious effect of financial distress on health: near-
ly two-thirds (66.3%) of respondents—of all age groups—reported that the stress 
of their bankruptcies made an existing physical or psychological health problem 
worse.  This seems consistent with available medical evidence. See Melissa B. Jaco-
by, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 560, 563–64 (2002); see also Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the 
Limit: The Association Among Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517 (2000).  
Note too that the National Consumer Law Center’s interviews found that 
“[c]ounselors repeatedly identified medical cost assistance as one essential ap-
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VII. Discussion 
Although the preceding data on elder debtors present a variety 
of findings pointing in somewhat different directions, some trends 
have emerged.  At the outset, we saw that elder debtors cite the inter-
est and fees on credit cards as a reason for filing in a strong majority 
of the cases (over two-thirds), reporting this reason with much greater 
frequency than younger filers.  In analyzing the elder group’s dispro-
portionate use of credit cards, we found no evidence that it is fueled 
by comparatively greater social shamelessness; elders reported feeling 
embarrassed and reluctant to file bankruptcy in similar proportions to 
everyone else.  We also found that elder debtors have more credit 
cards than the younger filers, suggesting that a greater number of cre-
dit cards may pose an increased risk of these credit-card-related bank-
ruptcies.  As for why there is so much (deleterious) reliance on credit 
cards, the findings become more complex.  On the one hand, the data 
show some hesitancy by elder debtors to take an assertive role in ne-
gotiating with their creditors, perhaps suggesting that they are more 
passive and less sophisticated than younger debtors.  They also feel 
disproportionately uncomfortable asking family, friends, or even 
charities for assistance in facing financial distress.  On the other hand, 
the findings do not show age differences in fears of perception; both 
young and old alike are equally worried about what others will think 
if they admit their financial distress. 
These results suggest that at least part of the elder debtors’ re-
liance on credit cards may be a disinclination to seek help from others.  
They also suggest that this disinclination may be fueled by psychoso-
cial forces driving seniors toward more anonymous forms of financing 
like the credit card, as well as, if not even more by, the lack of a sup-
port network for financial help in the first place.  Furthermore, the 
findings of the comparatively worse financial circumstances of elder 
debtors imply a two-pronged attack hitting elder Americans who fall 
into severe financial distress: first, they have fewer economic re-
sources to weather these downturns, having lower (and presumably 
more fixed) incomes than their younger peers; and second, they have 
a diminished financial support network to turn to for help in times of 
need, having fewer family and friends that they can ask for assistance.  
With these socio-economic handicaps, it is unsurprising that credit 
                                                                                                                             
proach to reduce the debt problems of elder clients.”  NCLC PART TWO, supra note 
33, at 15. 
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cards are turned to with such frequency.  Finally, and perhaps related-
ly, one should consider the finding of highly prevalent “medical 
bankruptcies” for elder debtors, either at similar or higher rates than 
younger bankruptcy filers.  With so many elder debtors citing medical 
reasons for filing bankruptcy and with the ability to charge medical 
expenses to credit cards, one cannot exclude the possibility that a sub-
stantial portion of these apparent “credit card bankruptcies” are addi-
tionally (or fundamentally) “medical bankruptcies.” 
The CBP data analyzed in this Article have allowed considerable 
insight into the circumstances of the rapidly growing ranks of elder 
bankruptcy filers.  This raises the question whether the Bankruptcy 
Code is well equipped to handle these elders’ need for financial relief.  
Sadly, the answer is negative.  
The initial problem is conceptual.  The theoretical structure of 
the famous “fresh start” in the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system cen-
ters on stripping debtors of all but a barebones set of exempt assets 
while allowing them to keep unfettered access to their future income, 
thus incentivizing them to return to work and social productivity.94  
The model is based upon future earnings as the key to rehabilitation: 
in exchange for the bankruptcy discharge, your creditors take away 
most of your assets, but you get to keep your future income intact and 
eventually start to re-accumulate savings and rebuild your life.95
                                                                                                                             
 
 94. This, of course, is subject to debate, but it is at least one non-contentious 
narrative of the policy underlining the income-focused fresh start in the U.S. Code. 
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
173, 178 (1987) (“Freeing a debtor’s future earnings provides incentives to bring 
the assets into being in the first instance . . . .”).  Baird also notes, however, that 
“there may be little difference between taking $20,000 from the debtor’s bank ac-
count and allowing him to enjoy $50,000 a year income on the one hand, and tak-
ing nothing from the bank account and garnishing $10,000 of his wages each year 
for two years on the other.” Id. at 178. 
  The 
problem with elder filers is two-fold: first, they have less time to re-
build earnings (admittedly while having less time to consume); and 
second, they are at a diminished income-earning point in their work-
 95. See, e.g., Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88 (“Younger people may well have 
another thirty years or more in the workforce after their bankruptcy filings, years 
in which they can rebuild retirement accounts, pay off mortgages, set aside some 
savings, and otherwise reestablish their financial security.”).  Recent theoretical 
treatment of this conceptualization from an economics perspective can be found in 
an interesting working paper by Michelle White. Michelle J. White, Personal Bank-
ruptcy: Insurance, Work Effort, Opportunism and the Efficiency of the ‘Fresh Start’ 
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/bankruptcy-theory-white.pdf. 
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lives.96  Retirees or near-retirees are supposed to rely upon accumu-
lated savings, not future income, to support themselves.  Retirement 
income is notoriously flat to boot.  The bankruptcy system’s parsimo-
nious treatment of savings and its pre-occupation with future income 
is poorly suited to an elder debtor.  Indeed, the quintessential asset 
exemption of “tools of the trade” seems of limited financial help to a 
retiree.97
Paradoxically, the Code does try to accommodate this disconnect 
by exempting retirement assets from creditor liquidation, which 
would seem to respond to the concern that non-workforce debtors 
need to be able to keep their savings to fund retirement.
 
98  The prob-
lem, however, is that the data suggest retirement accounts are a lux-
ury of the rich, which means that their protection is of little benefit to 
the median bankrupt debtor.  The CBP data collected on the retire-
ment account assets scheduled in debtors’ petitions found that the 
median debtor reported no assets in his or her retirement accounts.  In 
fact, even the seventy-fifth percent quartile (i.e., the top twenty-five 
percent when ranking by amount of retirement assets scheduled) re-
ported only $300 in total retirement savings.  This contrasts with the 
general population, where the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 da-
ta indicate that 52.6% of the population has at least some money in a 
retirement account.99
                                                                                                                             
 
 96. This does not even consider the requirement that a Chapter 13 debtor re-
quires “regular income.” 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006). 
  Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code’s aspiration 
of rehabilitating debtors based on sheltering future income and cur-
rent retirement assets seems more optimistic than effective—most of 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006).  The homestead exemption might provide 
more help to elder debtors if we assume that they are more likely to have accrued 
equity in their homes by paying off mortgages over time. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).  
General population data, however, show an increasing number of elder Americans 
still carrying mortgages on their homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING 
SURVEY, tbl.3-15 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing 
/ahs/ahs07/ahs07.html. 
 98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(12), 541(b)(5) (2006).  Although, as pointed out 
decades ago, there is no intrinsic reason why general savings accounts do not 
serve the same retirement income-replacement function as a specially designated 
pension account. Daniel L. Skoler, The Elderly and Bankruptcy Relief: Problems, Pro-
tections, and Realities, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 120, 127–28 (1989). 
 99. BRIAN K. BUCKS ET AL., FED. RESERVE, CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES 
FROM 2004 TO 2007: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES A23 
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/ 
scf09.pdf. 
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these people have spent down their retirement savings already, as-
suming they even had any to begin with.100
VIII. Recommendations 
 
So what can be done?  If future income protection and retirement 
asset exemption are insufficient to meet the needs of the rising ranks 
of seniors filing for bankruptcy, what can the law do?  Possible solu-
tions exist both inside and outside the bankruptcy system.  Using the 
Bankruptcy Code, the law could target the specific financial problems 
faced by elder debtors.  For example, the restrictions on discharging 
credit card debt could be relaxed (which would reverse BAPCPA’s 
seemingly misguided innovation of increasing their severity).101  Simi-
larly, recent congressional reform targeting medical bankruptcies for 
streamlined treatment could be followed, which again would reduce 
the burden on the increasing number of elder debtors.102  A more crea-
tive idea might be to offer age-specific relief, which many jurisdictions 
do in according elder residents lower tax rates.103  Indeed, several 
states have exemption laws that are expressly age-specific.104
                                                                                                                             
 
 100. See Eleanor Laise, Tapped Out: Pinched Consumers Scramble for Cash, WALL 
ST. J., June 2, 2008, at A1 (documenting raiding of retirement accounts by dis-
tressed consumers coping with the financial meltdown). 
  Perhaps 
recognition of the limited earning potential of elder debtors militates 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2006).  I am ignoring potential supply-side effects 
largely out of skepticism they will have meaningful ex ante impact. 
 102. See Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2009, S. 1624, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 103. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCES § 18-10-9 (2009) (municipal income 
tax exemption for certain taxpayers over age sixty-four); N.Y.C., N.Y.,  N.Y. 
ADMIN. CODE § 11-245.3 (2009) (real property tax exemptions for certain taxpayers 
aged sixty-five and older). It is also true at state levels. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 59, § 5 (2010) (real property tax exemption for certain taxpayers over age 
seventy); MO. REV. STAT. § 137.106 (2009) (property tax exemption for certain tax-
payers aged sixty-five and older). 
 104. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 487.010, § 704.710-730 (West 2009) (different 
homestead laws for debtors aged fifty-five and older and for debtors aged sixty-
five and older); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201-212 (2007) (different homestead laws 
for debtors aged sixty-five and older); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651:91-96 (2007) (differ-
ent homestead laws for debtors aged sixty-five and older); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 4422 (2003) (different homestead laws for debtors aged sixty and older); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § 1.A (2010) (different homestead laws for debtors 
aged sixty-two and older); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-3 (2004) (different exemp-
tion laws for debtors aged seventy and older). 
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in favor of higher property exemptions for their age group.105  There 
are myriad possibilities creative minds can envision.106
These are all useful devices for within-bankruptcy reform, but 
the most striking findings of this analysis have been the hopelessness 
of the elder debtor.  If seniors have fewer friends to turn to for help 
with financial distress, it seems difficult to mandate by legislation 
more friends.  Rather, the underlying causes of the financial distress 
need redress.
  
107  Thus, if, for example, medical bankruptcies are sink-
ing elder debtors, then perhaps reforming the health care system is a 
more efficacious social intervention.  Similarly, if reliance on credit 
cards is driven by insufficient support networks, then maybe public 
lending programs, such as the United Kingdom’s “Social Fund,” 
could provide some relief (even if limited to seniors to conserve re-
sources).108
                                                                                                                             
 
 105. Decades ago, some commentators explored this approach. See Skoler, su-
pra note 
  Finally, education and outreach would serve twin func-
tions both of impressing upon seniors the importance of seeking out 
assistance when needed—asking for help in a context where sociolo-
gists theorize such asking is a difficult task—as well as warning them 
of the deleterious effects of the credit card as a financing vehicle to 
98, at 127.  Our data show that elders have more home equity than young-
er filers.  The median home exemption claimed was $10,000 for younger filers and 
$15,000 for elders (p < 0.02).  (Means were $22,991 and $54,024, respectively (p < 
0.02).)  This suggests that age-specific exemption law reform would be narrowly 
tailored. 
 106. The National Consumer Law Center reports contain a prodigious array of 
policy proposals to help seniors struggling with rising credit card debts. See NCLC 
PART ONE, supra note 33, at 28–32. 
 107. Some policy commentators have struggled with the scope of appropriate 
age-based financial reforms.  “An important question . . . is whether policies or 
other interventions should directly address the special needs and vulnerabilities of 
elders or instead target particular problems that disproportionately impact eld-
ers . . . .” DEANNE LOONIN & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
LIFE AND DEBT: A SURVEY OF DATA ADDRESSING THE DEBT LOADS OF OLDER 
PERSONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 36 (2006), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885398; see also Kurt Eggert, Lashed 
to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders 
from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 718–19 (2003) (discussing backfire 
concern of “compassionate ageism” infantilizing elders who are the subject of legal 
reforms). 
 108. For a description of the Social Fund, which publicly guarantees consumer 
loans to low-income debtors, see Geraint Howells, Seeking Social Justice for Poor 
Consumers in Credit Markets, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 278 (Iain Ramsay ed., 1997). 
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backstop current consumption shortfalls (the “cement life raft”).109  
While this may require a change in legislative direction, some winds 
do seem to be shifting.110  On an optimistic note, perhaps increased 
use of the debit card—a payment device toward which elders exhibit 
some skepticism—might be an easy intervention to achieve.111
IX. Conclusion 
 
Whether policymakers choose to engage any of these possible re-
forms remains to be seen.  Increasing numbers of elder Americans are 
falling into the financial ruin of bankruptcy, and data from the CBP 
suggest that that phenomenon is linked not just to medical causes, but 
the growing use—indeed, disproportionate use—of credit cards that 
carry overwhelming interest and fees.112
                                                                                                                             
 
 109. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: 
WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (WITH SURPRISING 
SOLUTIONS THAT WILL CHANGE OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE) 123–62 (2003).   
  Further data from the CBP 
suggest that this reliance on credit cards may stem more from a reluc-
tance to ask for help than a desire to build up unsecured debt strategi-
cally.  While the reluctance to seek help may come from sociological 
factors unique to seniors, it may also come from the sheer lack of any-
one from whom to ask for help—in the face of an environment where 
a rising number of debtors cannot meet their everyday expenses on 
their incomes.  If this last case is true, then this increase in elder bank-
ruptcy filings is the canary in the coal mine, warning of problems that 
will become even worse as the baby boom cohort enters these income-
 110. See, e.g., Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act, H.R. 3366, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Although Social Security benefits are not subject to garnishment or at-
tachment in bankruptcy, many financial institutions nevertheless garnish these 
deposited benefits on behalf of creditors. H.R. 3366 § 2(a).  This proposed bill 
would have prohibited funds made available to the Secretary of Treasury or the 
Commissioner of Social Security from being used to promote or encourage direct 
deposit of Social Security benefits until the Secretary of Treasury promulgated 
rules protecting these funds from garnishment. H.R. 3366 § 2(b).  
 111. See Ron Borzekowski, Elizabeth K. Kiser & Ahmed Shaista, Consumers’ 
Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, and Price Response, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 149, 155 tbl.2 (2008) (reporting only twenty percent of checking account 
owners age sixty-five or older made even occasional use of a debit card).  
 112. Note that it is the fees and interest specifically on the credit cards that are 
problematic, which suggests another outlet for policy intervention.  Congress 
seems to have taken up this mantle with encouraging speed. See, e.g., Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 
Stat. 1734 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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restricted and support-network-deteriorating senior years.113
                                                                                                                             
 
 113. As noted in an early work from our project, the deteriorating lot of the 
elder debtor cohort could have a “trickle down” effect on younger filers too—baby 
boomers who hoped to turn to their parents for help in times of financial need. See 
Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88. 
  This 
may require reconsidering the level of public support guaranteed re-
tired members of society—a political question much too daunting to 
undertake in the scope of this Article reporting bankruptcy data, but a 
difficult question society will ultimately be unable to avoid. 
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